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The rise of the American education finance reform move-ment began after a series of state supreme court cases challenged the constitutionality of school funding systems 
and the inter-district inequalities they propagated. Since its incep-
tion, the reform movement has focused on improving educational 
quality for needy students across the United States—a movement 
that eventually lead to the practice of targeting state educational aid 
to individual school districts on the basis of demonstrated need. 
Aid-targeting targeting policies have been met with controversy, 
however, since financial redistribution tends to face opposition in 
parts of the country with greater financial and political capital. 
Outside of arguments for and against targeting policies, liter-
ature related to the education reform movement rarely explores the 
extent to which states truly target their aid to school districts and 
under what conditions (either at the local or state level) they do so. 
The study aims to reveal patterns by which states distribute funds 
to school districts. While results from this study address a number 
of related questions, its central focus is to assess the extent to which 
U.S. states—relative to how they have in the past—distribute their 
education aid on the basis of school district enrollment and district 
poverty. Other queries are addressed in this study. If states are not 
targeting their funds on the basis of school district enrollment, on 
what basis are they doing so? Do certain conditions or characteris-
tics determine the amount of aid school districts receive? Can the 
presence or absence of some statewide characteristics—like which 
political party controls the state or whether the state supreme court 
has issued a ruling on the state’s education system—make a state 
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more or less likely to engage in targeting practices?  Some of these 
questions have been considered in the scholarly literature, but the 
age of most studies hinders their contemporary relevance. 
This study investigates the above questions to determine 
states’ current practices of targeting education aid to school dis-
tricts. The rest of this paper proceeds in the following order. Sec-
tion II outlines previous research related to the educational finance 
reform movement. Section III outlines data and empirical model 
used in the study. Section IV presents the study’s main findings, 
and Section V concludes.
ExIstIng REsEaRch
Most states' school districts fund their schools predominant-
ly through the use of local property taxes (Sadker and Zittleman 
2007). The considerable variation from district to district in terms 
of local property values—and, subsequently, tax revenues—causes 
schools' resources to reflect their communities’ relative wealth (Bid-
dle and Berliner 2002). This finance system, which creates a wide 
range of resources in school districts, has produced a movement 
whose aim is to equalize school resources by examining and re-
forming the practice of financing schools with property taxes (West 
and Peterson 2007). This movement is notable for a few reasons. 
First, local responsibility for funding schools is a standard that 
dates back to the earliest colonial classrooms; changing this system 
would represent a significant break from the fabric of the American 
educational system (Sadker and Zittleman 2007, 235). Second, the 
movement to equalize school district resources makes a tacit pre-
sumption that school funding and school quality are linked; both 
sides of this issue will be examined later. Third, how states are dis-
tributing their money is important because nationwide, state edu-
cation expenditures account for approximately fifty percent of the 
dollars spent on education annually in the United States.1 Finally, 
1 The National Center for Educational Statistics reports that in FY2002, 49.3 percent of 
the average school district's funding came from state sources. In FY2002, approximately 
$420 billion was spent on education nationwide
one of the proposed mechanisms for equalizing school finance is 
targeting resources to disadvantaged districts. This in turn has 
raised questions about both the constitutionality of using property 
taxes to fund education and whether education is a constitutionally 
guaranteed right—questions that were most notably raised in the 
U.S. Supreme Court case Serrano v. Priest. The degree to which the 
practice of targeting resources to disadvantaged districts has been 
initiated by the states, and on what basis, is the focus of this study.
A wide body of literature examines the determinants of edu-
cation finance reform. Topics include the history of this movement, 
whether or not a school district's resources affect the education its 
students receive, and the effects of state intervention on the local 
level. Education finance issues are complex, interrelated, and con-
tinuously developing. While financial disparities between school 
districts are evident and commonplace throughout the United 
States, there is contradictory evidence in the literature that these 
disparities have any effect on student achievement or education 
quality. This contradiction makes it difficult to establish consensus 
on what course education finance reform should take.
Tiebout (1956), in his seminal work, “A Pure Theory of Lo-
cal Expenditures,” described an economic model where every com-
munity provides services in accordance with its citizens' demands 
and taxes them accordingly. Tiebout's model is often cited in edu-
cation finance research as an explanation of inter-district resource 
inequality. However, his model assumes that citizens at the margin 
are fully mobile and can vote with their feet and move to a commu-
nity that satisfies their demands. The reality is that citizens in the 
poorest communities do not have the resources to meet the market 
conditions for obtaining better education. Left without options, 
many poor families are forced to stay in areas where their children’s 
educational needs may not be adequately met. This reality of inad-
equate schooling for some students was the impetus for the school 
finance reform movement. The legal claims and challenges that have 
driven and continue to drive this movement mostly push for state 
interventions to provide for more equal inter-district resources in 
order to counter achievement disparities. However, the effects of 
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district resource equalization are a topic for which the literature 
provides contradictory evidence.
Inter-district Resource Inequalities and Possible Effects on 
student achievement
In education, production function research can be used to ex-
amine the connection between a school's resources (inputs), finan-
cial or otherwise, and the educational achievement of that school's 
students (output).2  The first systemic evidence on this connection 
was the 1966 Coleman Report “Equality of Educational Opportu-
nity,” which found that minority students in the United States both 
achieved less than their white peers and tended to be more affected 
by school quality. The Coleman Report also used wide-ranging data 
on race, achievement, and school resources to conclude that minor-
ity teachers and students were isolated away from white students 
into minority-majority enclaves within the educational system and 
relegated to schools and districts with fewer resources (Coleman et 
al. 1966). 
The literature in the production function field since the Cole-
man Report has often been inconclusive, able to be divided into 
two sets of findings. The first and most common finding is that a 
school's resources positively influence student achievement. Card 
and Krueger (1992) and Payne and Biddle (1999) convey this 
principle. They found that the higher-quality education provided 
by schools with adequate resources yielded higher student achieve-
ment or economic returns later in life or both. Payne and Biddle 
succinctly summarized their conclusions by saying, “surely it is time 
to put to rest the absurd myth that level of funding does not matter 
for public schools in America” (Payne and Biddle 1999, 12). The 
second finding in production function research is that a school's 
2 Although there is some debate about the use of the term “production function” versus 
“input-output approach,” in education research, “analysts use the production function 
approach and multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between the output 
of the education process and the inputs into this process (Lamdin 1996, 155). Both this 
article and Krueger’s (1999) are valuable for their examination of educational production 
functions.
resources have very minimal or no effect on student achievement. 
Hanushek (1986, 1989) provided examples of this “no-connection” 
school. He wrote, “detailed research...provides strong and consis-
tent evidence that expenditures are not systematically related to 
student achievement” (Hanushek 1989, 49). Instead, Hanushek 
(1986, 1989) and Wenglinsky (1998) argue that contextual factors 
like race, parents' education, and socioeconomic status are driving 
achievement disparities. Socioeconomic status has an effect both 
on where individuals are able to live and the quality of schools that 
they have access to. Additionally, historical racial achievement gaps 
create parental education disparities that are then passed on to sub-
sequent generations of children (Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 
1999; Duncan and Magnuson 2005). The idea that out-of-school 
contexts also affect student achievement is one that dates back to the 
Coleman Report, which indicated that minority students seemed to 
be more affected by the neighborhoods surrounding their schools 
than white students. Proponents of school-finance equalization 
have subscribed to the belief that a school's financial resources do 
affect the achievement of its students and that more money toward 
disadvantaged students can overcome the obstacles of poverty and 
parental education gaps. This belief has led proponents of reform 
to pursue redress through both legislative and judicial means.
state legislative and Judicial Interventions in Education 
Finance
The education finance reform movement, starting with the 
Serrano case in California, took root and grew in a number of states, 
and continues to grow in other states. Many legislators and courts 
see education finance reform as a means of addressing educational 
inequality. However, targeting policies remain both controversial in 
the literature and, in many states, unimplemented.
The 1971 Serrano v. Priest case in California started the wave 
of school finance litigation that would change the face of American 
education expenditure. Litigants in these cases, charging that the 
education being offered in their schools was inadequate, unequal, 
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or in violation of a state's constitutional guarantees, sued their lo-
cal school districts and, in some cases, the state education agency, 
for redress of the educational conditions. Twenty-six state supreme 
courts have ruled that their state education finance systems are un-
constitutional. In these states, changes in school funding formulas 
were most often enacted. In the states whose finance systems have 
not been overturned by the courts or where no judicial challenge 
has been raised, legislatures have often taken up school finance re-
form. Evans et al. (1997) and Murray et al. (1998) examined school 
finance litigation's effects on both legislation implementation and 
per pupil expenditures. They found that when state courts ruled lo-
cal tax revenue-based education finance policies unconstitutional, 
states shouldered a larger percentage of school funding. After such 
a ruling, states were also more likely to redistribute funds from rich-
er to poorer districts. They also found that states that tried solely 
to legislatively mandate increased expenditures for disadvantaged 
districts or expenditure equity between districts were less likely to 
achieve these end than states that also had a judicial mandate for 
reform. This finding may be attributed to the fact that a judicial 
mandate acts as a grim trigger and forces a state legislature to act on 
an issue that it otherwise would not have to; without the backing 
of a judicial mandate, a legislature may be less politically willing to 
reform their school finance system. Additionally, a judicial mandate 
provides cover for politicians in state legislatures; by blaming the 
court decision, legislators can deflect responsibility for resource re-
distribution away from themselves.
Mintrom (1993) discussed an area of education finance re-
form that other authors had not. He examined the political obsta-
cles that stall the implementation of targeting policies. Redistribu-
tive targeting generally involves taking a percentage of tax revenue 
from each relatively wealthy school district and then using those 
funds to offer supplements proportional to other districts’ finan-
cial need. Mintrom said that impoverished municipalities are faced 
with a tough choice: “tax their poor constituents at higher rates or 
devote fewer resources to education than rich districts” (Mintrom 
1993, 847). He also noted that the political economy in a state 
rarely makes targeting policies politically popular, and this in turn 
reduces their political viability. Mintrom also discussed two other 
local-level obstacles to targeting. The first is that parents are gener-
ally concerned with getting their children the best education possi-
ble; for parents in wealthy districts, redistributing money to poorer 
schools, and thus away from their children, is not viewed favorably. 
The second obstacle to targeting is that because communities and 
individuals with resources predominantly hold political control 
and influence, districts with fewer resources lack the political clout 
to push for finance reforms. Kozol (1991) also wrote extensively 
about this dilemma using case studies, which revealed that parents, 
students, and administrators in wealthy districts were unwilling to 
see their resources go elsewhere. These discussions of the political 
obstructions that impede school finance reforms in state legisla-
tures lend credence to the Murray, Evans, and Schwab studies that 
found that school finance reforms without judicial weight behind 
them were less successful than those with them.
arguments For and against targeting Policies
Redistributive targeting practices sprang up in many states 
following their supreme court's mandating new education fund-
ing formulas. These practices are supported by various pieces of 
education finance literature. De Bartolome (1997) and Murray, 
Evans, and Schwab (1998) found that targeting policies and state 
supreme court cases have led to an increase in overall state funding 
for education but that this additional financial support has been 
offset by increased taxes.  De Bartolome—by controlling for other 
variables—found that between 1970 and 1990, state court deci-
sions accounted for 18 percent of state education aid increases. His 
findings lend support to Murray, Evans, and Schwab's research that 
state supreme court cases can increase a state's overall level of edu-
cation funding.
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1997) are the leading 
voices in the “rising tide” school of thought that supports target-
ing practices by individual states. They found that “a reallocation 
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of resources from resource-rich children to resource-poor children 
will mean greater future aggregate income for society as a whole,” 
and counter criticism of redistribution by noting that “the increase 
in future earnings for the children who gain resources more than 
compensates for the lost future earnings from those children who 
lose resources” (Fernandez and Rogerson 1997, 69). While Bour-
guignon and Rogers (2007) found this benefit as well, they added 
a call for more progressive taxation and argued for more efficiency 
in how education resources are used. Specifically, they called for 
“policies that improve incentives, information, and accountability 
[that] can raise the quality of schooling” (Bourguignon and Rogers 
2007, 744).
Supporters of targeting policies highlight the rise in aggre-
gate societal wealth stemming from increased education funds. 
But while there is a large body of literature showing support for 
targeting policies, there is an equally large body opposing them. 
The argument against targeting policies consists predominantly 
of findings that increased state intervention in local affairs causes 
apathy, inefficiency, and even decreases in student achievement. 
Berger and Toma (1994) conducted a nationwide examination of 
SAT achievement data. They found that students in states that re-
quired master's degrees for teacher certification (used in this study 
as an indicator of increased state education regulation) generally 
perform worse on the SAT than their peers in states with fewer 
teacher certification regulations. Husted and Kenny (2000) built 
from this research in their study that used 34 states' SAT achieve-
ment data as the dependent variable and the amount of state-level 
school funding as the independent variable. Their findings are in 
the same vein as Berger and Toma's: increased state intervention 
(increased state share of school funding) leads to inefficiency, in-
dicated by lower SAT scores. The authors also found that state 
equalization of education expenditures lead to decreases in over-
all educational achievement but did not change the distribution of 
achievement. Husted and Kenny found that overall when states 
mandated equal inter-district spending all schools performed less 
well, with poor school districts performing the worst. Husted and 
Kenny also noted that an increased state role in local education 
leads local constituents to hold schools less accountable for their 
achievement. This causes inefficiency that is also addressed in the 
literature.
Fischel (2002) offers a number of arguments against state in-
volvement in the education system. He contended that redistribu-
tive policies can lead to “taxpayer revolts” like California's Proposi-
tion 13 in 1978.3 Furthermore, Fischel notes that state intervention 
in local schooling can lead to apathy or revolts at the local level as 
citizens become increasingly disconnected from the funding pro-
cess and feel unable to influence it. On top of this, Fischel writes: 
“the measurable educational outcomes have either declined or not 
changed. No social science study persuasively connects the school 
finance litigation with better outcomes for children from disadvan-
taged homes” (Fischel 2002 115). In a particularly damning conclu-
sion, he summarizes by saying “at its worst, school finance litigation 
has engendered dog-in-a-manger equality of low-quality education. 
At its best, it seems to have done little more than shift tax burdens 
and property values in ways that offer no systematic benefits to the 
poor” (Fischel 2002, 115).
to What Extent are states Employing targeting Practices?
While there is an abundance of literature drawing contradic-
tory conclusions on the value of implementing targeting practices, 
there is a dearth of research about the extent of state targeting. Mor-
gan and Pelissero (1989, 1992) are the leading scholars in this field 
and offer the most comprehensive research on state-level targeting 
practices. The authors found in their studies that the distribution 
of aid, either by the federal government or the states, was tied most 
closely to school district enrollment and not to school district re-
sources. They also found that states were more effective targeters 
3 Taxpayer revolts like Proposition 13 are instances where states and communities choosing 
to pay less for education overall in an effort to keep resources from being redistributed to 
more impoverished districts. This is a hurdle to the implementation of targeting policies 
that Mintrom (1998) also mentions.
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than the federal government. According to their research, which 
examined school districts in forty-four states, the non-enrollment-
based aid allocations that occurred were often targeted to districts 
in financial need. However, there was a lot of interstate variation 
in targeting practices. Morgan and Pelissero identified nine states 
as simply “better targeters.” The authors admit that more research 
needs to be conducted to find out what policies and practices make 
these states more efficient and willing to target than others. Still, 
their research fails to address whether a state's school finance for-
mula or other state-level variables affect a state's targeting practices. 
Another weakness of these two studies is that they were both based 
on data from 1982. Since that data comes only a decade after the 
inception of the push for education finance reform, it does not pro-
vide a contemporary view of targeting by the states. 
some Evidence of What affects school targeting Practices
Overall, the literature on what factors affect targeting practic-
es is scant. It appears that only Figlio, Husted and Kenny's (2004) 
research utilized multivariate regression to see what variables af-
fected the distribution of education expenditures. They found 
that, in accordance with the Tiebout model, greater within-state 
wealth and a larger number of school districts lead to more dis-
parities in wealth between districts. They also found that Demo-
cratically controlled states had more spending equality because of 
that party’s tendency to propose and support policies addressing 
the needs of the poor. They found significant evidence that a state 
supreme court ruling declaring a state's education finance system 
unconstitutional caused a decrease in school funding inequality. Fi-
nally, they found that more heterogeneous populations in a state 
contributed to school district financial inequality; this finding also 
supports the Tiebout-sorting model, which describes how diverse 
school districts cater to a wide spectrum of demands for school 
quality and level of taxation. 
Other research in this area has been narrowly tailored. An 
example is Fletcher and Kenny's (2008) research on the effect the 
elderly have on school spending. They held that a drop in school 
funding in areas with large elderly populations was generally offset 
by a per pupil funding increase derived from the decreased number 
of children in these same areas. De Bartolome (1997) found in his 
research that state education aid increases were attributable to in-
creasing amounts of wealth disparity within a state.
Evidence that the elderly affect school finance exists in the 
literature in a number of places. Poterba (1997) concluded that 
increasing percentages of the elderly resulted in lower per-pupil 
spending, especially when the elderly and the students were from 
different racial groups. Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) discov-
ered a small but significant negative effect on funding at the district 
level that was caused by the elderly; this effect was larger at the 
state level. Ladd and Murray (2001) determined that the direct ef-
fect on school spending caused by the elderly was indistinguishable 
from zero but that the elderly may have indirect effects on school 
spending.  Brunner and Balson (2004) surmised that the elderly 
were generally more supportive of local spending than statewide 
spending on education. Finally, Fletcher and Kenny (2008) used 
the median voter model to find that the effect of the elderly on 
school spending was both negative and significant, but they did 
note that states and school districts should not be fearful of pre-
cipitous drops in funding because of an aging population.
The research in this area, especially Figlio, Husted, and Ken-
ny's, was a significant contribution to understanding how and why 
states target. However, many questions remain unanswered about 
state education aid targeting practices. These questions—and why 
their answers are important—are discussed below.
stUdy dEsIgn
the need for a contemporary study
This paper is partially based on Figlio, Husted, and Kenny's 
(2004) study, which addressed some of the glaring gaps in the lit-
erature on education state resource inequalities. Redistributive tar-
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geting practices are used by the states to address these inequalities. 
But today—more than twenty-five years after the period in which 
Morgan and Pelissero's research was based—to what degree are 
states targeting aid to school districts on a non-enrollment basis? 
In states that do target, which characteristics render a district more 
likely to receive targeted funds? What role does a state's aid for-
mula have on the degree to which it targets its funds? This paper 
addresses these questions using variables that have been examined 
in the literature and others, like student poverty, that are absent. 
Morgan and Pelissero recognized these things as questions for fur-
ther research at the end of their 1989 study. By building on Mor-
gan and Pelissero's research on targeting practices by the states and 
on Figlio, Husted, and Kenny's research on the variables targeted 
by states, this paper will offer insight into how far the education 
finance reform movement has come and, potentially, how much 
farther it has to go to deliver on its promises to students in impov-
erished districts nationwide.
theory and Explanations
As described in the literature review, education finance re-
forms that originated because of state supreme court decisions 
have been changing funding formulas and the way state aid is dis-
tributed to school districts. Those that originated from legislative 
decisions have had less impact. This study will primarily consider 
the connection between school district enrollment and state aid per 
pupil in an attempt to determine if states are targeting to school 
district enrollment at a greater or lesser rate than they were in 
1982. In their 1989 and 1992 studies, Morgan and Pelissero found 
that states were primarily distributing aid to school districts on the 
basis of enrollment, not financial need or other district characteris-
tics. All of these other district characteristics being equal, however, 
we would anticipate that the districts with the most students would 
receive the most state aid; the fact that these other characteristics 
are not equal is what makes the question of states' redistributive 
targeting practices relevant.4 No other comprehensive study exam-
ining the connection between school district enrollment and per 
pupil state aid has been conducted since the Morgan and Pelissero 
studies, creating both a gap in the literature and a need for a more 
contemporary examination of this topic. This study will provide 
such an examination.
The secondary mission of this study will be to examine de-
terminants of state aid other than school district enrollment. Fi-
glio, Husted, and Kenny (2004) examined a number of these de-
terminants including the black population in a state, the number 
of school districts per student (where a low number indicates 
monopoly and the absence of Tiebout choice), the percentage of 
people living in metropolitan areas, state median and mean income, 
Democratic party control of a state's government, the presence of a 
state supreme court ruling overturning a state's education finance 
system, and the degree of a state constitution's mandate for school 
funding equity, among other variables. While Morgan and Pelis-
sero's and Figlio, Husted, and Kenny's works described how these 
factors affected the allocation of state educational resources from 
state to state, neither study provided evidence of whether or not 
targeting practices had shifted from primarily focusing on school 
district enrollment to focusing on a district's financial need. None 
of the studies discussed earlier included an examination of a state's 
funding formula as a determinant of state aid to school districts. 
Additionally, many of the variables utilized by Figlio, Husted, and 
Kenny (2004) are based at the state level of analysis. This study will 
incorporate both district and state level variables.
This study will advance a few hypotheses: When comparing 
school districts, enrollment, not need, continues to be the main de-
4 It is important to note that school district enrollment, in addition to being an important 
determinant of state aid, is politically important as well. Both legislative districts' 
boundaries and number of legislators are based on population. Legislative districts with a 
large number of representatives will have more political capital to push for funding for their 
school districts. Similarly, governors can exercise their veto power on measures that do not 
distribute funding to districts where their political base resides.
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terminant of state education spending.
•	 If	enrollment	is	still	the	predominant	determinant	of	state	
aid to school districts, states may not be employing redistributive 
targeting practices that provide additional aid to school districts on 
the basis of financial need. 
•	 If	states'	per	student	aid	to	school	districts	is	significantly	
tied to non-enrollment determinants, the evidence would suggest 
that there has been a shift toward targeting practices since 1982—
the last year that targeting was examined nationally. These deter-
minants include either district levels of need or other characteris-
tics, like racial composition, or both. This finding may represent an 
attempt by the states to close achievement gaps between different 
socioeconomic or ethnic groups.
coding and Measurement of concepts
Because this study will examine how states target aid, school 
districts will be the primary unit of analysis. There are approxi-
mately twenty thousand school districts in the United States ac-
cording to the National Center for Education Statistics. This study 
will not sample school districts that have incomplete data for any 
of the variables it considers. In order to capture any changes in 
targeting practices by the states, this study will utilize data from 
three school years: 1995–1996, 2000–2001, and 2005–2006. This 
method will provide a longitudinal view that has not been previ-
ously examined in the literature.
This study will focus primarily on three variables but will ad-
ditionally consider others. All of these variables appear in Table 1. 
Except as otherwise specifically noted these variables are obtained 
from the Core of Common Data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics.
Primary dependent Variable
•	 Per student state aid (STATEAID): coded as the total amount 
of aid given to a school district divided by the district's re-
ported enrollment. 
Primary Independent Variables
•	 School district enrollment (ENROLL): indicates the total num-
ber of students from pre-kindergarten to grade twelve in a 
given district.  
•	 Federal free lunch eligibility (FREELUNCH): represents the 
number of students in a school district who are eligible for 
federal free lunch (FREELUNCH) programs; if states are 
targeting their aid to districts on the basis of financial need,5 
I would expect this variable to be positively tied to state aid 
because higher values of FREELUNCH indicate higher pov-
erty in a district's students.
secondary Independent Variables
Each of these variables will provide insight into district-level 
characteristics through which states gain or lose aid support. If any 
or all of these characteristics has a significant effect on per student 
state aid, it will support the idea that states are targeting their aid 
toward local conditions and needs rather than solely toward school 
district enrollment.
•	 Own-source revenue per pupil (OWNSOURCE): represents 
the total amount of local education revenue divided by a dis-
trict's enrollment. This is a measure of a district's effort, i.e., 
how much it invests in schools from local revenue. It is un-
clear how this variable will change in relation to the state aid 
a district receives; it could have a positive relationship with 
state aid if a state decides to reward districts for their local 
effort, or it could have a negative relationship if a state views 
5The federal free lunch program is often used as an indicator of student, school, or district 
poverty status. Some examples include Krueger (1999), Lambin (1996), Caldas (1993), 
and Caldas and Bankston (1997).Sirin (2005) notes, “School SES is usually measured on 
the basis of the proportion of students at each school who are eligible for reduced-price or 
free lunch programs at school during the school year. Students from families with incomes 
at or below 130 percent of the poverty level are eligible for free meals (419).”
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the capacity to raise local revenues as an indicator of a district 
not needing additional financial aid. 
•	 District debt per pupil (DISTDEBT): coded as a school dis-
trict's outstanding debt at the beginning of a given fiscal year 
divided by the district's enrollment.  If states are targeting 
their aid on the basis of financial need, DISTDEBT should 
vary positively with per student aid. 
•	 District percentages of black (BLACK) and Hispanic (HIS-
PANIC): these variables are calculated by taking the number 
of each group of students in a district and dividing it by total 
district enrollment. These variables will test whether states 
are directing funds to districts with high percentages of two 
groups on the lower end of the achievement spectrum.  
This study will also examine five state-level variables to see what 
effect they have on aid distribution.
•	 Political party control (PARTY)6: this variable will be con-
structed by assigning each state a value between 0–3. A coding 
of 0 indicates that neither chamber of the legislature nor the 
governorship is controlled by the Democratic Party. Codes of 
1, 2, or 3 correspond to the number of aforementioned bod-
ies controlled by the Democratic Party in a given state. This 
variable will examine if party control at the state level shifts 
states toward reducing spending inequality. These data will be 
obtained from the National Council of State Legislatures. 
•	 The presence of a state supreme court case relating to the state's 
school finance system (SUPREMECOURT)7: a 0 value will in-
dicate the absence of such a case overturning the state's school 
finance system; a 1 value will indicate the presence of such a 
case.  These data will be obtained from the National Center 
for Education Statistics' education finance division.
6 This is a variable that Figlio, Husted, and Kenny (2004) examined; in their study 
they found that states with Democratic Party control had more spending equality than 
Republican controlled states because Democrats tend to represent the poorer populations 
in a state.
7 This variable will be incorporated to re-examine Evans, Murray, and Schwab's (1997) 
findings that after such a supreme court decision occurred, states were more likely to 
redistribute funds from richer districts to poorer.  
•	 Percentage of residents in the state over 65 (ELDERLY): I 
anticipate that states with higher percentages in this vari-
able would target less due to a small, but general, decrease in 
school funding in areas with high proportions of elderly. 
•	 States' Gini coefficients for 1999 (GINI): the Gini coefficient is 
a measure of a state's wealth distribution. States with a Gini 
coefficient closer to one (less equal distribution) are anticipat-
ed to distribute aid based on enrollment more than on other 
factors. 
•	 Presence of one of two state funding formulas (FORMULA): 
the final state-level variable is one that has not been examined 
in the literature. These data will be obtained from Education 
Week's EdCounts.org datasets, as well as from the National 
Access Network, a project housed at Teachers College, Co-
lumbia University. Two different types of funding formulas 
will be examined: foundation formulas8 and foundation/
local-effort equalization formulas.9 Foundation formulas 
are expected to increase the effect of enrollment on state aid 
because every additional pupil will yield additional fund-
ing under the foundation formula. Foundation/local-effort 
equalization programs may have a similar effect that will be 
tempered by this formula's incentives to raise money locally. 
In this study, a dummy variable will be used for each formula 
to determine if either corresponds to more aid targeted on a 
non-enrollment basis. Because no research has examined how 
the distribution mechanisms for a state's aid affect its target-
ing practices, this variable's incorporation will look for each 
formula's relative ability to get state aid to districts on the ba-
sis of local characteristics.
8 The foundation formula is described by EdCounts.org as “a set amount of funding 
that the state deems necessary for a basic education. [In this formula,] responsibility for 
providing this funding is shared between state and local districts.” Foundation formulas are 
the most prevalent nationally and are found in 33 states.
9 Local-effort equalization “rewards districts for efforts to raise revenue through additional 
local taxes” by providing “an additional level of state aid” according to EdCounts.org. This 
hybrid formula is found in eight states.
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Table 1: Coding Variables Used
Research design
This study will primarily investigate, through the use of or-
dinary least-squares (OLS) regressions, the relationship between 
school district enrollment and free lunch eligibility, the two main 
independent variables, and per student state aid, the dependent 
variable.  In order to examine the relative importance of these vari-
ables, they will be converted into logarithmic measures. This will 
help to linearize the data. Using a log-log model of analysis reveals 
the relative importance of the independent variables on the depen-
dent variable. This method of analysis will answer questions like “for 
every additional percent increase in enrollment in a school district, 
by what percent does per student state aid increase?” by creating 
log-log elasticities. Answering these kinds of questions will show 
the variables most closely tied to state aid. For example, if a mar-
ginal increase in enrollment results in less subsequent per student 
aid than a marginal increase in another variable, like percentage of 
black students, this will provide evidence that a state is targeting its 
aid more toward districts with high percentages of black students 
than toward districts with high levels of overall enrollment.
Six separate models will be estimated in this study: one model 
with and one model without state fixed effects for each of three aca-
demic years. The variables that will be controlled for in this study 
are own-source revenue per student, district debt per student, the 
percentages of black and Hispanic students in a district, the pres-
ence of one of two funding formulas in a state, the presence or ab-
sence of a state supreme court case overturning the state's education 
finance system, the political party in control in the state, the state's 
population percentage of people over the age of sixty-five, and the 
state’s Gini coefficient.  All of these variables are included to test 
if—as a result of the education finance reform movement—the 
United States has moved away from using school district enroll-
ment as the primary determinant of aid. If this movement exists, 
the models will identify whether states are now targeting aid to 
districts with financial need or targeting aid to districts with high 
populations of traditionally underachieving groups of students.
Morgan and Pelissero's research (1989, 1992) revealed school 
district enrollment to be the predominant determinant of state aid. 
I expect that this study will find that enrollment is still the main 
determinant of state aid but that it will be less influential than it 
was in Morgan and Pelissero's studies. If states have not shifted 
their targeting practices, I will find a strong relationship between 
enrollment and per student state aid. This would be evidence that 
targeting practices are not being employed by the states. If this re-
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order to see this study’s results about contemporary state practic-
es. Pelissero and Morgan (1989) offered the following regression 
based on data from 1982:
$State aid per pupil = $1,810 + ($0.01 x Enrollment) + (–.17 
x per student Income) + ($0.41 x Own-Source Revenue Per 
Pupil) + ($0.66 x District Debt Per Pupil) 
(R2 = .11) (N=13,654)10 
This regression indicates a positive relationship between enroll-
ment and state aid. All other factors in school districts being equal, 
a theoretical expectation is that school districts with the largest en-
rollment would receive the largest amounts of state aid. All other 
factors in school districts, however, are not equal, which led Pelis-
sero and Morgan to examine other variables in their model. The 
negative relationship between per student income (the authors' 
district wealth indicator) is potentially explained as states being 
disinclined to target money to wealthier districts. In 1982, it also 
appears that states were apt to reward districts for effort based on 
the $0.41 coefficient on own-source revenue. Pelissero and Mor-
gan’s last variable, district debt per pupil, has a positive relationship 
that fits the theoretical expectation of states targeting aid to im-
poverished districts that carry more debt. Examining Pelissero and 
Morgan's model is a valuable contrast to this study’s results.
Table 2: Effect of Enrollment on State Aid
Enrollment was arguably the most important variable in this study 
10 T-statistics are not reported here because Pelissero and Morgan (1989) did not report 
them.
 lationship has weakened, I will find that non-enrollment character-
istics in school districts have partially or completely supplanted en-
rollment as the predominant determinant of state aid.  This would 
be evidence that redistributive targeting practices are performing as 
intended in an attempt to reduce inter-district resource disparities. 
If neither of these results is found, it will mean that enrollment is 
no longer the predominant determinant of aid but neither are any 
of the other variables that this study examines. Any of these three 
results would raise important questions for education finance re-
form policies in the United States.
FIndIngs
This study yields a number of interesting and, in some cases, 
unexpected results. Before discussing these, I have a few notes. 
First, though a district's per student debt had been an intended 
variable, the data set from the NCES was incomplete and greatly 
reduced the number of observations (from 8,000-11,000 to under 
2,000). Because FREELUNCH is already an indicator of poverty 
in a district, DISTDEBT was dropped to allow for more observa-
tions. Second, this study's intention was to replicate Morgan and 
Pelissero's 1989 and 1992 work as a model. This replication per-
mitted a valuable comparison, on a one-to-one basis, of the results 
from Morgan and Pelissero’s 1982 research with data from one to 
two decades later. However, replication became impossible because 
I dropped DISTDEBT from my model. Additionally, Morgan and 
Pelissero’s 1992 research does not combine enrollment and other 
factors (i.e., race, district poverty) into one model but instead keep 
those variables separate. Their model examines enrollment used 
total state aid, not per student state aid, as the dependent variable. 
This method makes it impossible to compare on a one-to-one basis 
the models in this study and those found in Morgan and Pelissero 
(1992). Their 1989 study, however, provides a valuable regression; 
and it is with this regression that the analysis of this study's results 
begins.
A look at the state of targeting from an earlier period is in 
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because state aid has been so closely tied to it in the past. First, the 
regression of the log of per student state aid on the log of district 
enrollment without any other independent variables was exam-
ined—the results of which are reported in Table 2.11  In both 1995 
and 2000, the regression estimates positive coefficients (0.025 and 
0.031 respectively) that are in line with Morgan and Pelissero's re-
sults; these support the assertion that enrollment is at least par-
tially driving the amount of state aid a district receives. However, in 
2005, the coefficient changes to –0.013, which would indicate that 
larger district enrollments do not drive increased levels of state aid. 
All of these values were significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
Second, six different regressions were run involving the full 
model: both with and without state fixed effects for each of the 
three academic years examined. The results of the extended mod-
el are presented in Table 3. More surprising than the coefficient 
change on enrollment in the 2005 partial model was that in all six 
full models, school district enrollment varied negatively with per 
student state aid. Five of these coefficients were significant at the 
p < 0.01 level. Only the coefficient in the non-fixed effects 2000–
2001 model returned insignificant results. The implication of this 
unexpected finding is that enrollment no longer drives allocated 
state education aid.
If increased enrollment is not yielding additional state aid for 
school districts, what factors are? This study’s hypothesis was that 
if states are not targeting aid on the basis of enrollment, the states 
might instead be targeting to districts that are impoverished or 
have large populations of students from historically underachiev-
ing groups (in this study, black and Hispanic students). The results 
here were mostly supportive of that hypothesis. The free lunch 
eligibility variable, which was expected to vary positively with aid, 
did so in five out of the six models. However, the coefficients were 
positive and significant in only three of the six models. This result 
is important because it shows that state aid is being targeted to fac-
11 While I performed the regression with both the variables and their logs, only the results 
of the logged regressions are discussed here. This is because the unlogged regressions did 
not return significant results and were an inferior fit to the logged regressions.
tors other than enrollment.
Results from the two variables measuring percentages of mi-
nority students in districts were mixed both directionally and in 
terms of significance. Though percentage of black students should 
vary positively with state aid if states are targeting to districts with 
large African-American populations, it did so (and was statistically 
significant) only in the year 2000 model with state fixed effects. 
The percentage of black students varied negatively and significantly 
in the models without fixed effects from all three years; however, 
the results from models without fixed effects are unlikely to be as 
valid as the estimates that include fixed effects. The percentage of 
Hispanic students varied positively in five models (three of which 
were statistically significant and included fixed effects), but it also 
had a statistically significant negative coefficient in the 2005 model 
without fixed effects. The implications of the findings related to 
districts’ percentages of black and Hispanic students on states’ tar-
geting practices are many, and they will be discussed in-depth in 
the next section.
With respect to own-source revenue per pupil, states could 
potentially react in one of two ways. States could either reward dis-
tricts for their relative local financing effort or take funding away 
because of perceived affluence or self-sufficiency. In 1982, own-
source revenue varied positively with state aid, but in all three years 
examined here, own-source revenue per pupil varied negatively 
with state aid. The coefficients on own-source revenue per student 
are consistently negative, and they are significant in four of the six 
models. This finding indicates that nationwide, states' attitudes 
have shifted away from rewarding local financing effort and instead 
have cut funding from districts that were able to raise money lo-
cally. The problem that these results present is that if either of these 
postulates were true, districts would be expected to begin modify-
ing their behavior in order to maximize the amount of state aid 
received. This conclusion introduces the problem of endogeneity 
because the direction of causality becomes ambiguous; we cannot 
know if the districts' behaviors are affecting states' tendencies to 
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Table 3: Results Obtained – Full Model
shift money toward or away from own-source revenue raising or 
vice versa.
Results from the other state-level control variables were con-
tradictory.  The signs and significance levels were not consistent as 
evidenced by Table 2. These fluctuations made it difficult to draw 
meaningful or clear results; this problem may have been because 
this study’s unit of analysis was the school district.12
discussion
This study's results support the hypothesis that states are tar-
geting their education aid to districts that need it based on pov-
erty. That practice of states targeting money toward impoverished 
districts is one that education finance reformers, for decades, have 
been fighting for judicially and otherwise (West and Peterson 
2007). Though enrollment was anticipated to be the predominant 
determinant of a district's level of per-student state aid, regressions 
from the 1995–96, 2000–01, and 2005–06 school years show that 
enrollment, contrary to findings from previous studies, varies nega-
tively with aid. These same regressions showed that per-student 
state aid varied positively with both the number of students in the 
district eligible for free lunch programs and the percentage of His-
panic students in the district. 
 At first glance, these results appear to represent a victory 
for advocates of redistributive policies across the country. These re-
sults bear some examination, however. First, though a shift away 
from distributing state aid based on enrollment does represent a 
trend toward targeting based on district-level characteristics, it is 
12 State level variables like FOUNDATION, FOUNDATIONLEE, 
SUPREMECOURT, and PARTY proved unwieldy in analyses primarily conducted at 
the district level. Though a state may have a general type of funding formula, the way 
that that formula actually operates is often unique to an individual state. Supreme Court 
decisions are similarly unique, and their impacts are difficult to ascertain through binary 
variables. Lastly, state party politics are better measured through a system other than a 0–3 
scale. GINI was dropped because of collinearity with the fixed effects models. ELDERLY 
encountered the same inconsistencies as the other control variables. These variables are 
better suited to a model examining what conditions promote more total state education 
spending.
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important to remember that many of our nation's most troubled 
school districts are also the most heavily populated (Biddle and 
Berliner 2002, 54). For these districts, many of them urban, shift-
ing funds away from enrollment may inadvertently end up taking 
money away from the same students that advocates of redistribu-
tion are trying to help through school finance reform. This is es-
pecially true because in none of the six models is the positive free 
lunch eligibility coefficient larger than a negative district enrollment 
coefficient which means that the net effect is a decrease in funds to 
poor districts with high enrollment. 
Similarly disconcerting, the coefficients on the percentage 
of black students variable indicate that districts with higher per-
centages of African-American students see less state education aid 
directed toward them. This conclusion is troubling because black 
students are still achieving less than students of other races and 
ethnicities.13 African-American students, who lag the farthest be-
hind other races in terms of the achievement gap, appear to be a 
financial detriment to districts trying to receive state education aid 
funds. Federal Title I funds that are directed to high-poverty school 
districts likely make up some of the decreases caused by the nega-
tive coefficients found here on both district enrollment and per-
centage of black students. Another silver lining in these results is, 
of course, the mostly positive coefficients seen on the percentage of 
Hispanic students variable. Though the negative coefficient on the 
2005 non-fixed effects model is significant, the three more accurate 
fixed effects models show significantly positive rates of targeting to 
Hispanic students.
 The amount of unexplained variance in this study’s mod-
els lends credence to the idea that there are variables affecting 
targeting that have not been examined by this study. The largest 
R-squared obtained here is 0.243, comparatively small when that 
leaves 75 percent of the variance unexplained. It begs the question 
of what other factors could be affecting the ways that states distrib-
13 Results from the 2007 National Assessment of Educational Progress (the NAEP or the 
Nation's Report Card) math and reading assessments show black students trailing all other 
races at both the 4th and 8th grade levels. Similar results hold for 2000, 2003, and 2005.
ute their aid. Student achievement, as measured by performance in 
state standardized assessments, could be driving aid distribution if 
funds are being allocated to either reward high-achieving districts 
or help to raise achievement in underperforming schools. Deter-
mining what these other factors is a task for future research.
 This study expands the literature of education finance 
targeting. It also updates a previous finding in this area. But more 
questions remain. First, in a future analysis, more district level 
variables could be examined to determine more specifically which 
district-level characteristics are being targeted toward. There are 
many examples of these to consider. A few are district population 
density (to see if money is being targeted to rural or urban dis-
tricts), district percentage of special education students, or district 
percentage of ELL students. Additionally, achievement variables 
could be incorporated to determine if districts that are not meeting 
achievement goals have additional funds targeted to them. Finally, 
it would be valuable to revisit the federal targeting question in Mor-
gan and Pelissero's 1992 study.  That study showed that there were 
no discernible targeting practices at the federal level, but since the 
implementation of NCLB, and with accountability an increasingly 
important part of the current domestic education culture, it would 
be interesting to see if districts are getting additional federal aid 
based on achievement levels.  It would be equally interesting to see 
if the federal government tends to target to other characteristics, 
or if it is still not engaging in targeting practices. This field is full 
of potential future inquiries—in large part to the ways that NCLB 
has affected federal-state, state-local, and federal-local government 
relationships.  With these changing dynamics, it is important to 
examine how fiscal policy is being affected.
conclUsIon
This study's results are notable because they differ from those 
found in the most recent study of state aid targeting. The school 
finance reform movement appears to have gained ground in its ef-
fort to redistribute aid to poor and traditionally underachieving 
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students. Regressions conducted in this study covering three aca-
demic years show with statistical significance that school district 
enrollment, a historically dominant and positive determinant of 
where aid is allocated, now varies negatively with per student state 
aid. These regressions also show that school district poverty, as ex-
amined through student eligibility for federal free lunch programs, 
is being targeted toward nationally as evidenced by significant and 
positive correlations with aid. Hispanic students are being similar-
ly targeted, but coefficients for populations of black students vary 
negatively with state aid, which is a surprising finding that merits 
special attention in future research. 
 This study is valuable in the context of today’s education 
system for a few reasons. First, the American economy is in danger 
of being dragged down by a workforce that is not as educated as 
it could be. The school districts that need to have educational aid 
targeted to them the most, because of poverty or populations of 
students from historically underachieving groups, are often also the 
school districts that are failing to produce well-educated and well-
informed citizens. Fortunately, this study’s results indicate that 
states are shifting their funding practices to try to ensure that dis-
tricts that are in need are targeted with more funds. Unfortunately, 
this funding change is neglecting at least one notable group, black 
students, who continue to achieve less than other racial groups and 
are not realizing the financial benefits of increased targeting.
 Finally, this study leaves the door open for new research 
in a number of directions. First, the low levels of explained vari-
ance in these models means there could be other variables affecting 
targeting and the distribution of state aid that were not considered 
in this study. Additionally, further examination into state behaviors 
toward district own-source revenue, NCLB's effect on federal tar-
geting practices, or the apparent shifting of funds away from black 
students that is revealed by this study would all be valuable contri-
butions to this area of research. Such research is indispensable for 
understanding how education revenues can be spent to best aid the 
students who need the most assistance
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cooPERatIon and IntEgRatIon: 
REcoMMEndatIons FoR tRansatlantIc 
EnERgy sEcURIty
 Andrei Stetsenko
While American dependence on energy imports has been extensively analyzed and critiqued, the United States has done relatively little to help address its Eu-
ropean allies’ reliance on imported energy.  The European Union 
(EU) is the “world’s largest importer of oil and gas,” buying eighty-
two percent of its oil and fifty-seven percent of its natural gas from 
abroad.  Half of EU oil imports and a third of EU gas imports 
come from Russia (Cohen 2007, 2). This dependence, in conjunc-
tion with an EU energy market that remains divided along national 
borders and a pattern of bilateral deals between European national 
energy monopolies and external suppliers, endangers not only co-
operation within Europe but also the reliability and independence 
of European diplomatic and political action with regards to U.S. 
interests (Noël 2008, 8). Unable to form a common position based 
around a unified energy market, EU member states must increas-
ingly choose between stable energy supplies and siding with the 
United States on key diplomatic issues ranging from sanctions on 
Iran to reciprocal investment rights.
This paper aims to address this issue by analyzing the roots 
and effects of the disunity of European energy markets, noting the 
U.S. interest in an integrated, reformed European energy market, 
outlining policies that mitigate dependence on imported energy, 
providing two case studies which illustrate the drawbacks of current 
policy and potential of new proposals, and finally suggesting three 
major platforms of reform to be pursued jointly by the United States 
and the European Union. I argue that a European Union featuring 
a more competitive private energy market operating in the context 
of robust institutional oversight would enjoy significantly greater 
